[爆卦] 林穎孟之後 林飛帆:柯P陰險狡詐的威脅 at Gossiping

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卦點:林昶佐之前就說過,台北市長的職權涉國家主權以及統獨!(註1)吳崢也指出兩岸一
      家親九二共識是一樣的意思(註2)。林亮君也說過,相當害怕柯P兩岸一家親,害
      怕柯P跟大陸的緊密關係(註3)。林穎孟甚至也說了,澳洲、日本、印度都在防中國
      ,相對之下台北市長柯P確實不夠謹慎!(註4)時代力量台北市參選人雖尚未決定挺
      or,但對柯P的危險性都不得不防。
      現在重量級人士留學英國林飛帆出聲了!他投書《外交家》指出,柯P將讓年底大選
      籠罩在陰險狡詐的威脅之下!他甚至批評林昶佐,根本小看了「兩岸一家親」的危險
      !!文中暗示柯P是連戰和馬英九對中政策的繼承人。你認為「兩岸一家親」九二
      共識不一樣?那你跟本就不懂!兩岸一家親根本是九二共識的平行原則!柯P靠民粹
      崛起,他是中國的新代理人。投書後,不少粉絲在林飛帆的臉書下面推文支持,為
      林飛帆重返台灣政壇抬轎。

      以下投書為我個人翻譯,若有出錯請幫忙指出。

註1:#1RWB4e8v
註2:#1RW0AVm1
註3:https://youtu.be/Ka0FUVTKwU8?t=235 影片3:55處
註4:#1Rf4F-of 林飛帆投書《外交家》網址: https://thediplomat.com/2018/09/will-taiwan-trap-itself-into-one-china-again/ 標題:Will Taiwan Trap Itself Into ‘One China’ Again? In Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je, China might have found a useful wedge to influence Taiwan’s domestic politics. 台灣會再次將自己陷入「一中」嗎?在台北市長柯文哲那裏,中國或許能找到一個 切入點,能影響台灣的內政。 內文: Taiwan’s commitment to resist China’s encroaching expansionism is under challenge — not only from China, but from within, thanks to its upcoming local elections. It is unlikely that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) administration, led by President Tsai Ing-wen, will accept Beijing’s “One China” policy in the foreseeable future, given the strategic adjustments of many democracies toward China and polls in Taiwan consistently showing that there is little desire for “unification.” Still, the local elections in Taiwan this November pose an insidious threat to its future stance. More specifically, the current mayor of Taiwan’s capital of Taipei, Ko Wen-je, a popular political figure campaigning for re-election and an advocate for China’s core Taiwan policy doctrine that “two sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family,” may inject uncertainty into Taiwan’s resolve to counter Chinese aggression. 台灣對中國的侵略擴張政策的拒絕,現在備受挑戰:這挑戰不只來自中國,也來自台灣內 部,真是托那場即將到來的選舉的福呢!(諷刺語氣)由蔡英文領導的民進黨政府,未來不 太可能接受北京的一中政策,因為許多民主國家已對中國進行戰略調整,以及台灣國內的 民調,都顯示幾乎沒有與中國接近的慾望。然而對於台灣未來的這種態勢,將被今年11月 選舉當中的陰險狡詐的威脅所籠罩。具體來說,台灣首都台北市現任市長柯文哲,他可能 對台灣反擊中國侵略的決心的身上,注射不確定性,因為他是一位能連任的熱門人選,他 也是支持中國對台的核心政策:「兩岸一家親」的倡議者。 Much attention has been paid to Tsai’s refusal of the “1992 Consensus,” a disguised “One China” policy embraced by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT), currently the main opposition party. There are likewise a wealth of reports about China’s intensifying campaign against Taiwan since the DPP resumed office in 2016, including poaching Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, coercing foreign companies to erase references to Taiwan, restricting Taiwan’s participation in multiple international organizations, and escalating military threats toward Taiwan. Yet relatively little has been said about Beijing’s exploitation of — as well as its impact on — those who desire to accommodate its assertiveness through adopting surrogate doctrines and cultivating new proxies in Taiwan. 值得注意的是蔡英文對九二共識的拒絕。九二共識是一個糟糕的一中政策,中共和當前主 要的在野黨國民黨支持九二共識。自民進黨於2016年恢復執政以來,中國加強對台灣的壓 迫也有許多的新聞報導,包括奪取台灣的外交盟友、強迫外國公司取消提及台灣、限制台 灣參與多個國際組織、加劇對台灣軍事威脅。然而只有少數的新聞報導,提及北京對於那 些想要乘載北京的自信的有心人士的利用,以及這個利用之下造成的衝擊。這些有心人士 透過採用替代政策與培養新的在台灣的代理人的方式來承載北京的這份自信 [按:意指兩岸一家親是九二共識的替代,柯P是北京的新代理人]。 History of China’s Containment of Taiwan From Within 中國從台灣內部進行封鎖的歷史 China has continually sought to penetrate Taiwan’s political system and marginalize administrations which refuse to recognize Beijing’s “One China” policy by aligning with pro-Beijing politicians and political forces. In 2005, during the first DPP administration, Lien Chan, the former vice president and former president of the KMT, visited then-Chinese president Hu Jintao in China, forming a party-to party platform for negotiations that excluded the then-DPP government. Lien and Hu concluded their meeting with a historical agreement — the “Five-Point Vision for Cross-Strait Peace” — aimed at pursuing a peace agreement as an political end of the cross-strait issue under the “One China” framework. After the KMT returned to power in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou’s administration extensively implemented those visions, signing all agreements and cooperation schemes under the so-called “1992 Consensus.” 中國一直在思慮如何滲透台灣的政治系統,以及將拒絕一中政策的行政單位邊緣化,藉由 與親中人士與親中政治力量的密切合作。2005年,也就是民進黨第一次執政的期間,前副 總統也是前國民黨主席的連戰,拜訪當時中國主席胡錦濤,造就一個黨對黨的協商平台, 排擠當時的民進黨政府。連胡會達到一個歷史性的共識:兩岸和平的五大願景,旨在追求 一個和平的協議,作為一個將兩岸議題置於一中框架的政治目的。國民黨於2008年重返執 政,馬英九政府擴大採用這些願景,在所謂的九二共識下簽屬所有協議和合作計畫。 Ma’s approach pushed Taiwan into an asymmetric reliance on China both economically and politically, offering China overarching leverage over Taiwan, benefiting a few cross-strait businesses while sacrificing the majority of domestic labor, and causing Taiwan’s constitutional democracy to deteriorate in pursuit of the passage of those accords. While obtaining certain space on the international stage, Taiwan’s presence was perceived as an “authorized autonomy” granted by China, rather than evidence of its independence. This path triggered a great backlash from civil society in 2014 and eventually led to the KMT’s historic defeat in both local elections in 2014 and general elections in 2016. 馬英九的做法促使台灣在政治和經濟上形成了不對稱的依賴,提供了中國操控台灣的槓桿 ,讓利給少數的兩岸企業、犧牲了國內大部分的勞工。追求這些協議,導致了台灣憲政民 主惡化。在國際舞台上獲得一定空間的的同時,台灣的存在被視為被中國授予的「授權自 治」,忽略了台灣的獨立性。這條路導致了2014年民間社會的強力反彈,最終導致國民黨 歷史性的失敗,在2014年和2016年的選舉中。 From “the 1992 Consensus” to “Both Sides of the Strait Are One Family” 從九二共識到兩岸一家親 Against this backdrop, Ko Wen-je won a landslide victory as an independent in the 2014 Taipei mayoral race. It could not, therefore, be more ironic that he would then endorse the concept of China and Taiwan being “one family” and “sharing a common destiny” soon after taking office, turning his success as a once-breakthrough politician against the KMT’s dominance of Taipei into a potential opening for Beijing’s infiltration. 在此背景下,柯文哲在2014年台北市長選舉中,獨得壓倒性的勝利。也因此,柯P上任後提 出兩岸一家親以及命運共同體,是多麼具有諷刺性阿!他曾經突破國民黨的這份成功,竟 轉變為北京滲透的潛在開端。 Ko’s recognition of this terminology satisfies Beijing’s demand that cross-strait dialogues at all levels must take place under the “One China” framework. It has paved Ko’s way to attend the Taipei-Shanghai Forum since 2015 and ensures his ability to meet with high-ranking Chinese officials. While some might argue Ko’s overtures are not a direct concession to “One China” similar to that of the Ma administration, such claims are based on a misunderstanding of Beijing’s overarching notion of “One China.” 柯P對這些術語的認可,滿足了北京的要求,也就是兩岸在各個層面的對話,必須在一中框 架下。為柯P自2015年開始的雙城論壇開啟了道路,也確保了他與中國高官見面的門路。許有些人會說,柯P的提議並非馬英九政府那種對一中政策的讓步;這種說法根本是對北京 「一個中國」概念的誤解。 Emphasizing the “kinship” between Taiwan and China has always been an essential appeal of China’s strategy to contain Taiwan. The origin of this concept can be traced back to 1979 with the “Open Letter to Taiwan Compatriots” in which China addressed the “kinship” of people living on both sides. Former Chinese presidents Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao had extensively used this phrase. Xi Jinping himself, likewise, deployed the phrase both as vice president and later president of China when meeting with Taiwanese delegates and leaders between 2010 and 2018. In 2017, the 19th National Congress of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) officially enshrined this concept, making it a parallel doctrine to the “1992 Consensus” in its outline of future Taiwan policy. 強調台灣與中國之間的親屬關係,一直都是中國想統一台灣的核心訴求。這個概念的起可 追溯到1979年的「給台灣同胞的公開信」,信中中國提到了兩岸人民的「親屬關係」。前 中國國家主席江澤民與胡錦濤廣泛使用這個詞彙。同樣地,在2010~2018年間,習近平作為 國家副主席乃至於國家主席,與台灣代表和領導人會晤時,都使用此詞彙。在2017年,十 九大將這個概念正式載入,使之成為對台綱要政策的九二共識的平行原則。 It is clear that “two sides of the Strait are one family” is a pivotal pillar of both Xi’s and China’s Taiwan policy. If the so-called “1992 Consensus” embodies Beijing’s sovereign claim over Taiwan, then the “one family” doctrine fulfills China’s nationalistic claim in suggesting there is only one nation on either side of the Taiwan Strait. In this era of frozen relations between Tsai and Beijing, China’s welcome of Ko’s overture indicates that the concept of “two sides of the Strait” being “one family” has been given a more critical status than it was thought to possess, arguably as the latest formula for Beijing’s co-opting of Taiwan’s rising political forces. 顯然,「兩岸一家親」是習近平與中國對台政策的關鍵性支柱。若所謂的九二共識體現了 北京對台的主權主張,那兩岸一家親則是滿足了中國的國家主義主張,表明兩岸同屬一個 國家。在蔡英文與北京的關係當前處於冰凍的狀態下,中國對柯P的提議表示歡迎,這表示 柯P主張的「兩岸」是「一家親」是處於比人們所想像的更為關鍵的地位,可以說是北京加 入台灣崛起的政治力量的最新方案。 Given that local elections in Taiwan serve as midterm exams for the incumbent central government, the importance of the role of the capital mayor in cross-strait relations, as well as Ko’s high popularity — which has led to him being frequently touted as a potential presidential candidate — Beijing’s attempt to leverage this election should be concerned. 鑒於台灣的地方選舉是當前中央政府的期中考試,首都市長在兩岸關係中的角色的重要性 、以及柯P的高人氣導致他經常被捧為總統候選人、以及北京試圖利用這次選舉,都需要被 加以關注。 For instance, Chinese state-run media CCTV recently featured positive coverage of Ko — a tactic similar to its previous propaganda for the KMT — which arguably implies Beijing’s public endorsement of him. Indeed, Ko may be China’s rare chance to establish a political beachhead in Taiwan by way of a new political proxy, as the KMT is highly unlikely to win back power in the short-term. Ko is a strong potential challenger for Taiwan’s presidency in the coming decade, and his rise may well result from his populist leadership style and nonpartisan nature, which allows him to tap into growing dissatisfaction with both major parties — the DPP and the KMT, 舉例來說,中國官媒中央電視台最近對柯P進行了正面的報導,這種策略類似之前對國民黨 的宣傳,這可以說是北京對柯P的公開支持。確實,柯P可能是中國透過新的政治代理人在 台灣搶灘建立一個政治灘頭的難得機會,因為國民黨短期內不可能贏回政權。柯P是未來十 年台灣總統的強大潛在挑戰者,他的崛起可能源於他民粹的領導風格以及無黨無派的性質 ,在人民對於國、民兩大黨的不滿的情況下,柯P得以切入。 It is unlikely that the majority of voters will accept Ko’s stance on China, but there is a clear tendency to downplay Ko’s cross-strait stance among his supporters due to his popularity. Even members from the pro-independence camp, such as New Power Party legislator Freddy Lim, misinterpret the weight of Ko’s “one family” phrasing in cross-strait relations. 多數選民不太可能接受柯P對中的立場,然而由於他的高人氣,柯粉傾向淡化柯P的兩岸立 場。甚至連親獨派的陣營例如時代力量立委林昶佐,都誤解了「兩岸一家親」在兩岸關係 當中的重要性。 Ko has had chances to readjust his stance on China, but has chosen to defend his acceptance of the “one family” concept as a pragmatic approach that helps Taiwan buy time. Despite such rhetoric mirroring the KMT’s in the past, Ko’s accommodation of Beijing has not assuaged its assertiveness toward Taiwan in any way. Rather, it has given Beijing more leverage to infiltrate Taiwan’s domestic political debates and signaled a reincarnation of the KMT’s past approach. In addition, the side effect of such overtures may further confuse the international community’s perception of Taiwan, in which misinterpretations perceiving Taiwan-China struggles as an “intra-family dispute” are common. 柯P曾經有機會調整他的對中立場,但是他卻選擇為「兩岸一家親」加以辯護,理由是「兩 岸一家親」只是個為台灣爭取時間的手段。這種想法與過去的國民黨如出一轍,此外柯P對 於北京的容納,並沒有緩和北京對於台灣的侵吞自信。相反,它給北京更多的影響力去滲 透台灣的內政辯論,這根本就是國民黨過去作法的新版本。此外,柯P兩岸一家親的附帶效 果是,它可能更進一步混淆國際社會對台灣的看法,這種誤解就是將台灣與中國的爭端視 為「國家內部的爭端」。 Bulwark of Democracy vs. Orbit of Authoritarianism 民主的堡壘與威權的勢力 To date, Xi’s “Two Centenary Goals” for the “Chinese Great Rejuvenation” have explicitly exposed China’s intention to challenge the geopolitical order, with taking Taiwan as an integral part of that grand scheme. Cross-strait relations, therefore, must be understood in the context of international geopolitics and the global order rather than merely a cross-strait affair. 迄今為止,習近平對「中國偉大復興」的「兩百年目標」明確暴露了中國挑戰地緣政治秩 序的意圖,台灣是此一意圖之下的一部分。因此兩岸關係必須在國際地緣政治與全球秩序 下才能被理解,而非僅僅是兩岸之間的事務。 As a vibrant democracy standing at the forefront of this encroaching revisionism, Taiwan’s determination to counter such expansion matters. Since many countries are now adjusting their strategies toward China’s assertiveness , including a growing concern over China’s interference in other nations’ democratic institutions, Taiwan should continue to make overtures to potential democratic allies around the world to counter China’s attempts at aggression, instead of placing itself again into an authoritarian superpower’s orbit. Accommodating China might be perceived as a way to bolster short-term security, but the price for Taiwan’s democracy and long-term capability to defend itself from authoritarian aggression will be overwhelming. 作為一個站在對抗擴張侵略修正主義的前線的一個充滿活力的民主國家,台灣的決心至關 重要。許多國家現在都調整了它們的對中策略,包括對中國干涉其他國家的民主制度的日 益關注,台灣應持續對潛在的民主盟友提出建議,對抗中國的侵略意圖,而不是將自己再 次投入威權強權的勢力範圍內。容納中國可能被視為一種支持短期安全的方式,但台灣民 主的價值,以及保護自己免受專制侵略的長期能力,才是重要的。 As a rising political force, Ko’s tendency to embrace “One China” has introduced a complicating factor into Taiwan’s future trajectory. Yet Taiwanese people might still be able to push back against such inclinations through a comprehensive examination of their political leaders’ stances. Neglecting the fact that “two sides of the Strait are one family” serves as a core concept of Beijing which traps Taiwan in an endless cycle of independence-unification debates will not help us to transcend domestic divergence. 柯P作為一個崛起的政治勢力,他傾向去擁抱一中,將為台灣未來的發展軌跡引入複雜的因 素。然而台灣人民仍然可以透過全面檢視他們的政治領導人的立場,來抵制這種傾向。兩 岸一家親是北京核心的概念,陷台灣於無止境的統獨辯論循環。忽略這個事實,無助於幫 助吾等超越國內的分歧。 Importantly, after experiencing Ma’s eight years of pro-China policy, Tsai’s turn from China, and the possibility of Ko’s rise, whether Taiwan’s commitment to counter China’s expansionism should continue to be bound by the personal will of political leaders in the future is indeed questionable. Further institutionalizing and consolidating Taiwan’s de facto independence are considerably more essential than restricting itself under the ambiguous discourse of “maintaining the status quo.” As China’s mounting assertiveness poses the unprecedented challenge to the democratic world, it would be in the international community’s best interests to support a free and independent future for Taiwan. 重要的是,經歷了馬政府八年的親中政策、蔡英文轉向中國、以及柯P的崛起,台灣對中國 侵略的對抗,是否應受到政治領導人的個人意志的約束,確實是一個問題。進一步制度化 加強保護台灣的獨立,將是一個重要的事,比在「維持現狀」這種含糊不清的話語中限制 自己還要重要。隨著國不斷增強的自信對民主世界造成前所未有的挑戰,支持台灣自由獨 立的未來,將是國際社會的最大利益。 --

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